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Nuclear Policy of the Bush Administration: A Critical Analysis
Mitsuru KUR OSA WA*
  The Bush Administration, which inaugurated in January 2001, has pronounced 
many policy statements that were quite different from the ones by the former 
Clinton Administration. In this article, 1 will critically analyze the nuclear policy of 
the Bush Administration as well as its security policy in general. First, 1 will 
introduce and examine some important policy statements by the Bush 
Administration chronologically. Then 1 will take up and analyze some concrete 
policies of nuclear-related issues; reduction of nuclear weapons, missile defense, 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and non-use of nuclear weapons. Finally 1 
will make the fundamental characteristics of the Administration's nuclear policy 
clear_
Nuclear-Related Policy Statements by the Administration
Remarks by the President at National Defense University, May 1, 20011)
  The remarks at the National Defense University is the First formal policy 
statement by the President, and it clearly expresses fundamental ideas of the new 
Administration that are cornerstone of its concrete policies, although details of the 
ideas are left for later clarification. 
  In the remarks, an a new threat he said, "Russia is no longer our enemy, but this 
is still a dangerous world, a less certain, a less predictable one...Unlike the Cold 
War, today's most urgent threat stems...from a small number of missiles in the 
hands of these states, states for whom terror and blackmail are a way of life." 
  In order to respond to the new threat, he said, "Today's world requires a new 
policy, a broad strategy of active non-proliferation, counterproliferation and 
defenses...We need new concepts of deterrence that rely an both offensive and
1)
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defensive forces ... Defenses can strengthen deterrence by reducing the incentive for 
proliferation. We need a new framework that allows us to build missile defenses to 
counter the different threats of today's world. To do so, we must move beyond the 
constraints of the 30-year-old ABM Treaty." 
  In regard to reduction of nuclear weapons, he said, "1 am committed to 
achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest-possible number of nuclear weapons 
consistent with our national security needs, including our obligations to our allies. 
My goal is to move quickly to reduce nuclear forces. The United States will lead 
by example to achieve our interests and the interest for peace in the world." 
  In this statement, the President Bush made Administration's fundamental 
posture clear by presenting his idea an the new threat to the U.S., the importance of 
missile defense, and unilateral reduction of strategic nuclear weapons.
Terrorist Attacks, September 11, 2001 and War against Terrorism
  Terrorist attacks an World Trade Center in New York and an the Pentagon in 
Washington, D.C. an September 11, 2001 have a significant impact an the security 
policy of the Bush Administration. President Bush declared a war against errorism 
and developed naively simple logic by asking everybody whether you were an our 
side or an terrorist side. In October, he started his campaign against errorists in 
Afghanistan. 
  Firstly, in order to proceed with his campaign, it was necessary to have an 
international cooperation, and he got necessary substantial cooperation ot only 
from allied and friendly countries like NATO states, but also from Russia. Further, 
even China supported his campaign against terrorism. As a result, a strong 
criticism to U.S. unilateralism which had been so popular among many states 
including the NATO states, Russia and China, was radically softened. It was a big 
change of international relations in the context of the U.S. 
  Secondly, as the terrorist attacks were carried out by crashing hijacked civil 
airplanes to the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, some argued against Bush's 
missile defense program by saying that terrorists have much wider Option for 
attacks than ballistic missiles. However, the Bush Administration argued for 
missile defense, insisting that these attacks accentuated the importance of the 
missile defense ven stronger than before. His argument has prevailed since. 
  Thirdly, in the domestic politics, the Democrats which commanded majority in 
the Senate were opposed to the missile defense program promoted by the President. 
During the debate an missile defense budget, the Senate was going to reduce the
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amount proposed by the President. However, the terrorist attacks an September 
1lth put priority an the non-partisan support to the war against terrorism, and 
induced to shelve the debate an the missile defense budget.2) As a result, original 
budget demanded by the President was accepted. 
  The Bush Administration was clever enough to exploit every opportunity that 
emerged in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, and pushed an his policy 
accordingly.
Unilateral Reduction of Strategie Nuclear Warheads, November 13, 2001
  The U.S. and Russia have conducted consultations an strategic issues in general, 
but they could not reach an agreement an how to deal with the ABM Treaty in 
particular. lt was expected that they would hammer out a compromise an strategic 
offensive weapons and strategic defensive weapons at the summit in Washington, 
D.C. and Crawford in November 2001. However, the compromise did not come 
about, and the U.S. announced its plan to unilaterally cut its strategic nuclear 
warheads at the summit.. 
  President Bush announced, "The current levels of our nuclear forces do not 
reflect today's strategic realities. 1 have informed President Putin that the United 
States will reduce our operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level 
between 1,700 and 2,200 over the next decade, a level fully consistent with 
American security,"3) 
  President Putin responded by saying, "Here 1 must say, we appreciate very much 
the decision by the President to reduce strategic offensive weapons to the limits 
indicated by him. And we, for our part, will try to respond in kind."4) Russia has 
strongly argued that nuclear reduction by the U.S. and Russia must be done by 
agreeing a treaty that is reliable and verifiable. 
  The announcement an the unilateral reduction is what Bush has been arguing for 
even before he became a president. U.S. position is that it prefers a unilateral cut 
that will be followed by Russia, and the U.S. will reduce even without reciprocal 




On this point, see Senate Carl Levin, "A Debate Deferred: Missile Defense After the September 
11 Attacks," Arms Control Today, Vol.31, No.9, November 2001, pp.3-5. 
"President Announced Reduction in Nuclear Arsenal
," Press Conference by President Bush and 
Russian President Vladimir Putin, The East Room, November 3, 2001. 
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001 /11 /print/20011113-3.html] 
ibid.
4 OSAKA UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW [No. 50: 1
a treaty and unilateral or reciprocal cut is quicker and easier to make. However, it 
seems that the real reason for a unilateral cut is U.S. desire to keep flexibility in 
force structure in order to adjust o changing future security environment.5)
Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, December 13, 2001
  President Bush has been emphasizing the importance of missile defense since or 
even before his inauguration, and has made up his mind to move beyond the 
constraints of the ABM Treaty of 1972. Initially he tried to get Russia's consent o 
jointly withdraw from the Treaty. However, he could not get an agreement an how 
to deal with the Treaty, and in December 2001, he finally decided to notify to 
Russia an the U.S. intention to unilaterally withdraw from the Treaty. 
  In his remarks an December 2001, he Said, "Today, 1 have given formal notice 
to Russia, in accordance with the treaty, that the United States of America is 
withdrawing from this almost 30 year old treaty...Today, the greatest hreats to 
both our countries come not from each other, or other big powers in the world, but 
from terrorists who strike without warning or rogue states who seek weapons of 
mass destruction ... Defending the American people is my highest priority as 
Commander in Chief, and 1 cannot and will not allow the United States to remain in 
a treaty that prevents us from developing effective defenses."6)
  The United States explained the reasons to withdraw form the ABM Treaty in 
diplomatic notes sent to Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine as follows:7
  Since the Treaty entered into force in 1972, a number of state and 
non-state entities have acquired or are actively seeking to acquire 
weapons of mass destruction. It is clear, and has recently been 
demonstrated, that some of these entities are prepared to employ these 
weapons against the United States. Moreover, a number of states are 
developing ballistic _ missiles, including long-range ballistic missiles, 
as a means of delivering weapons of mass destruction. These events 
pose a direct threat to the territory and security of the United States
5) On this point, see the report that is considered most influential to Bush's nuclear policy, National 
   Institute for Public Policy, Rationale and Requirenients for U.S. Nuclear Forces and Arms 
   Control, Volume 1, Executive Report, January 2001. 
6) "Remarks by the President an National Missile Defense," December 13, 2001. 
   [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001 /12/20011213-4.html]
7) "U.S. Diplomatic Notes an ABM Treaty," U.S. Department of State, Washington File, 14 
   December 2001.
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and jeopardize its supreme interests. As a result, the United States has 
concluded that it must develop, test, and deploy anti-ballistic missile 
systems for the defense of its national territory, of its forces outside 
the United States, and of its friends and allies.
  Reaction from the Russian Federation was rather restrained. President Putin 
explained, "We believe this decision to be mistaken. As is known, Russia has Jong 
possessed an effective System to overcome anti-missile defense. So, 1 can say with 
füll confidence that the decision made by the President of the United States does 
not pose a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation ... Russia was 
guided above all by the aim of preserving and strengthening the international legal 
foundation in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation of mass destruction 
weapons."8) 
  The U.S. decided to withdraw unilaterally from the Treaty once it became clear 
that the issue could not be resolved by consultation with Russia. This is the first 
case that the U.S. withdraws from an arms control and disarmament agreement. 
From the viewpoint of the U.S., the announcement of the withdrawal follows the 
provision of the Treaty and it is based an the determination that its supreme interest 
has been jeopardized. However, almost all other states haue argued that the Treaty 
is a cornerstone of strategic stability, a necessary base for international peace and 
security, and a prerequisite for further reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. 
  The announcement of the withdrawal from the Treaty by the strongest country 
in the world by giving priority to near-sighted national interest and by ignoring 
international public interest or the interest of legal stability and legal predictability 
may have an adverse effect to "the rule of law" in international society.
Nuclear Posture Review, January 9, 2002
  On Nuclear Posture Review report that was classified and submitted to the 
Congress an December 31, 2001, we know some elements of the report by a special 
briefing in January9) and a testimony in February 2002.1 0) Further, in March, some
8) "Televised Statements by Russian President Viadimir Putin," December 13, 2001. Disarmament 
   Documentation, December 2001. 
   [http://www. acronym.org.uk/docs/0112/doc01.html] 
9) "Special Briefing an the Nuclear Posture Review," January 9,2002. 
   [http://www. defensel ink.mil/news/Jan2002/tO 1092002-tO 109npr.html ] 
10) United States Senate, Committee an Armed Services, February 14, 2002, Testimony an the
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of the classified parts was leaked and published. ") 
  The first main point of the Nuclear Posture Review is that in order to respond to 
new kinds of threats, U.S. program an strategic force is to shift from threat-based 
approach in the Cold War era to capabilities-based approach, that is, from one 
based an Soviet or Russian threat to one based an capabilities of unpredictable or 
potential enemies. The U.S. needs capabilities to respond to those unpredictable or 
potential threats. 
  The second main point is that in stead of old triad (ICBMs, SLBMs and 
bombers), a new triad is necessary. The first component of the new triad is non-
nuclear and nuclear strike capabilities, the second is defenses including missile 
defense, and the third is a revitalized defense infrastructure with responsive 
capabilities. 
  As to the size of U.S. nuclear forces, the report lists North Korea, Iraq, Iran, 
Syria and Libya, as well as China and Russia, as the countries that could be 
involved in contingencies. Nuclear forces are divided into two categories, that is, 
operationally deployed forces and responsive forces. Operationally deployed 
strategic nuclear warheads will be reduced to the level of 1,700-2,200, and 
substantial number of warheads will be retained as responsive forces that can be 
returned to operational deployment in the case of contingencies. 
  In order to proceed to the construction of the new triad, it plans aggressive 
development and deployment of missile defense, urges the necessity to revitalize 
infrastructure for current nuclear warheads, plans to revive infrastructure for 
warheads production, recommends to shorten the time for readiness to resume 
nuclear testing, plans to sustain and modemize the forces of ICBMs, SLBMs and 
bombers. In particular, the report says that it is indispensable to give nuclear 
weapons a new task of defeating hard and deeply buried targets. 
  Regarding nuclear use doctrine, it is suggested that nuclear weapons would be 
used as a first strike to the targets which could not be destroyed by conventional 
weapons. Commitment o negative security assurances which means no-use of 
nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon states becomes more ambiguous, and first-
use of nuclear weapons to those sates is suggested. 
  On the whole, the report an Nuelear Posture Review reaffirms the military and 
political utility and importance of nuclear weapons. Although operationally
   Results of the Nuclear Posture Review. 
   [http: //www. senate.gov/-armed_servic es/e_witnessl ist. cfm? id=165 ] 
11) Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts], Submitted to Congress an 31 December 2001, 8 January 
   2002. [http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm]
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deployed strategic nuclear warheads will be reduced, it aims at the direction of 
revitalizing and modernizing U.S. nuclear infrastructure and of using nuclear 
weapons more easily. The general trend will jeopardize peace and security of 
international society.
State of Union Address, January 29, 200212)
  The State of Union Address by the President four months after the terrorist 
attacks mainly deals with the war against errorism, and it makes two purposes that 
the U.S. should pursue clear. The first purpose is to shut down terrorist camps, 
disrupt terrorist plans, and bring terrorists to justice. For this purpose, the U.S. is 
acting not only in Afghanistan, but also in the Philippines, Bosnia, Somalia and 
Pakistan. 
  The second purpose is to prevent terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, 
biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world, 
that is, to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or its 
friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction. 
  North Korea is a regime arming withmissiles and weapons of mass destruction, 
while starving its citizens. Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports 
terror, and Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support 
terror. States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming 
to threaten the peace of the world. 
  Following these analyses of the current situation, the address aggressively 
claims that "We will develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect 
America and our allies from sudden attack. And all nations should know: America 
will do what is necessary to ensure our nation's security." 
  The address hows the strong will of the President hat the U.S. will continue the 
war against errorism, criticize the axis of evil who support terrorists, and develop 
and deploy missile defense.
Signature of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, May 24, 2002
  Although President Bush had been consistently advocating a unilateral nuclear 
reduction, he finally agreed to negotiate a treaty with Russia, because President
12) "The President's State of the Union Address," The United States Capitol, Washington, D.C., 
  January 29, 2002. 
   [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01 /print/20020129-11.html]
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Putin strongly argued for a treaty of nuclear reduction and Bush thought some 
compromise was necessary to get and maintain Russia's cooperation in security 
issues in general. At the Moscow summit in May 2002, the Presidents igned the 
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. 
  The Treaty is very simple and concise, consisting of only five articles, which 
reflects U.S. reluctance to make a treaty. The Treaty contrasts markedly with the 
START treaties that are Jong and very precise. The content of the Treaty is just the 
same as what President Bush stated as a unilateral action. 
  Only Article 1 provides for the principal obligation that each Party shall reduce 
and limit strategic nuclear warheads, so that by December 31, 2012 the aggregate 
number of such warheads does not exceed 1,700-2,200 for each Party. Each Party 
shall determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive 
arms. 
  It is not clear whether the strategic nuclear weapons means operationally 
deployed strategic nuclear warheads as the U.S. declares. There is no provision an 
accounting rules of warheads. There is a high possibility that these may lead to 
different interpretation between the U.S. and Russia. 
  As only the final stage of the reduction process and neither reduction schedule 
nor midterm stage is provided for, the process of reduction seems to be unclear. In 
addition, there can be no Gase of violation during the reduction process except he 
final day. The final day of the implementation is the same as the final day of the 
treaty remaining in force. 
  There is no sub-ceilings an ICBMs, SLBMs or bombers, as each party shall 
determine for itself the composition and structure. There is no obligation to destroy 
withdrawn warheads as well as withdrawn delivery systems. The U.S. is planning 
to retain in storage many of the withdrawn warheads. 
  Under the SALT Treaties and the START Treaties, delivery vehicles beyond 
treaty limit were in fact destroyed as a legal obligation, though there was no 
obligation to destroy nuclear warheads. The possibility of the reuse of delivery 
vehicles was excluded under the past Treaties. However, the new Treaty permits 
the reuse of both nuclear warheads and delivery systems, which conflicts directly 
with the principle of "irreversibility of disarmament process".13) 
  There is no provision an verification and inspection in the Treaty, in spite of the 
fact that verification and inspection has been an indispensable component of arms
13) The principle of irreversibility has been agreed between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin since the 
   latter half of the 1990s, and incorporated into the final documents of the 2000 NPT Review 
   Conference, as one of the 13 steps for future nuclear disarmament.
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control and disarmament agreements. Under Article II, the Parties agree that the 
START Treaty remains in force in accordance with its terms. It implies that the 
verification and inspection mechanism under the START Treaty can be used for the 
implementation of the new Treaty. 
  Finally, the withdrawal from the new Treaty is much easier than the former 
Treaties. Under the new Treaty, each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, 
may withdraw from this Treaty upon three months written notice to the other Party. 
The former Treaties permit withdrawal an six months prior notification with 
statement that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have 
jeopardized its supreme interests. 
  Generally speaking, the most outstanding characteristic of the Treaty is its 
flexibility. The Treaty stipulates only the framework for the reduction but neither 
precise contents nor precise implementation process of the obligation, leaving each 
Party to decide. lt is precisely because the U.S. prefers a unilateral reduction to a 
treaty, and the U.S. wants to have as wide as possible free hand. 
  It is praiseworthy that the U.S. and Russia agreedto reduce each strategic 
nuclear warheads by two-third in ten years as legally binding obligation. Since the 
latter half of the 1990s, the relationship between the U.S. and Russia has 
deteriorated, and no negotiation an nuclear disarmament has conducted. Under the 
new framework, the new Treaty was Born. That is quite significant in the process 
of nuclear disarmament. However, the real value of the Treaty depends an bona 
fide implementation of the Treaty obligations.
National Security Strategy, September 20, 2002
  The report an National Security Strategy of the United States of America14) was 
published nearly two years after the inauguration of the Bush Administration. lt 
represents whole security policies of the Bush Administration and is referred to as 
"Bush Doctrine." In the introduction, it is asserted that today, the United States of 
America enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and 
political influence. America will act against such emerging threats as our enemies' 
seeking of weapons of mass destruction before they are fully formed. 
  Regarding strengthening alliance to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent 
attacks against us and our friends, it states; "While the United States will constantly 
strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to
14) The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, The White 
   House, Washington. [http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pfd]
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act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively 
against such terrorists, to prevent them from-doing harm against our people and our 
country." 
  On preventing our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with 
weapons of mass destruction, it says; "The United States has long maintained the 
Option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. 
The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction-and the more compelling 
the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty 
remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such 
hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act 
preemptively." 
  In these descriptions, the report emphasizes the importance and indispensability 
of taking preemptive actions against terrorists and rogue states. 
  Regarding transforming America's national security institutions to meet the 
challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century, it states; "We know from 
history that deterrence can fail; and we know from experience that some enemies 
cannot be deterred. The United States must and will maintain the capability to 
defeat any attempt by an enemy-whether a state or non-state actor-to impose its 
will an the United States, our allies, or our friends. We will maintain the forces 
sufficient to support our obligations, and to defend freedom. Our forces will be 
strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in 
hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States." It means the U.S. 
determination to prevent emergence of any military power that could be as strong as 
the U.S. 
  This report deals with security issues in general, but an the one hand, it implies 
in particular that if the threat from Iraq increases, the U.S. may act alone 
preemptively even if there is no military attack from Iraq. On the other hand, the 
massage that the U.S. force will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries 
from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of equaling the power of the U.S. is 
seems to be addressed to China. 
  As a whole, the report indicates that U.S. foreign policy will be conducted 
mainly based an the U.S. military strength.
U.S. Concrete Nuclear Policies
Reduction of Nuclear Weapons
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  The Bush Administration has dealt with the reduction of nuclear weapons from 
its beginning, and has been stating its intention to substantially reduce strategic 
nuclear warheads, based an the perception that the Cold War ended and Russia is 
no longer an enemy. Initially, President Bush was very negative to the concept of 
arms control and disarmament negotiation and treaty. He declared that the U.S. 
would reduce its strategic nuclear forces to the lowest-possible number consistent 
with our national security needs. The policy of unilateral reduction is formally 
based an the following two reasons; One is that Russia is no longer an enemy, and 
the other is that treaty-making will take longer time. 
  As is shown in the shift of U.S. fundamental security policy from threat-based 
approach mainly concerned with Soviet or Russian threat to capabilities-based 
approach mainly concerned with uncertain and unpredictable threat, the U.S. 
nuclear reduction policy reportedly needs to have flexibility in order to respond to 
uncertain and unpredictable threat. Behind the U.S. insistence an unilateral 
reduction rather than through treaty-making, there is the U.S. philosophy that the 
U.S. wants maximum free hand in the reduction of its nuclear weapons in order to 
cope with uncertain and unpredictable threat.15) 
  This initial stance has been gradually modified as the U.S.-Russia relation has 
changed after the terrorist attacks an September 11, 2001. In order to initiate the 
war against terrorism, the U.S. needs cooperation not only from allied countries like 
NATO members, but also from Russia that is very influential to Central Asian 
countries whose cooperation is indispensable for the Operation in Afghanistan. 
Russia also thinks it its interest to have cooperative relation with the U.S. The 
relationship between the two states has improved. During the consultations 
thereafter, the U.S yielded to Russia for negotiating a treaty, because Russia had 
been demanding to make a treaty in order to reduce nuclear weapons clearly and 
verifiably. 
  The Strategie Offensive Reductions Treaty that was signed in May 2002 
contains the same substance as the U.S. had declared unilaterally, and takes the
15) Ort this point, the most influential report was one published by National Institute for Public Policy 
   in January 2001. The report states; "The codification of deep reductions now, accordingto the 
   traditional Cold War approach to arms control, would preclude the U.S. de jure prerogative and 
   de.facto capability to adjust forces as necessary to fit a changing strategic environment. It would 
   render the U.S. vulnerable to the highly questionable assumption that the international 
   environment is and will continue to be relatively benign...Further adjustment to the U.S. strategic 
   forces must not be rendered practically or legally "irreversible" via codification in the traditional 
   arms control process." (National Institute for Public Policy, Rationale and Reqüirements.fbr U.S. 
   Nuclear Forces and Arms Control, Volume I, Executive Report, January 2001, p.viii.)
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form of a treaty as Russia had demanded. The principal obligation under the Treaty 
is for each party to reduce each strategic nuclear warheads to the level of 1,700-
2,200 according to each previous statements. Beyond this there is no precise 
regulations or limitations. As a result, the Treaty represents maximum flexibility in 
the implementation of the obligation, as the U.S. demanded. 
  The Treaty includes no definition of terms regarding principal obligation, no 
accounting rules of warheads, and no obligation of destruction of withdrawn 
warheads as well as withdrawn delivery vehicles. The U.S. plans to keep these 
withdrawn warheads and delivery vehicles in storage and may reuse in the future. 
There is no provision an reduction schedule or middle stage, and no provision an 
verification and inspection that has been thought indispensable in arms control and 
disarmament agreements. Finally, the condition of withdrawal from the Treaty is 
quite easy. 
  Thinking of the situation since the latter half of the 1990s where nuclear 
disarmament egotiation was at stalemate, the signature of the new Treaty in a new 
framework is praiseworthy. The challenge is how well this Treaty will be 
implemented; whether the Treaty obligation is smoothly implemented with the 
improvement of U.S.-Russian relation, or the U.S. will exploit the flexibility of the 
Treaty in order to advance its unilateral benefits. lt is expected that the Treaty will 
be implemented bona fade under the condition of transparency. 
  The issue of non-strategic or tactical nuclearweapons is a remaining important 
one in the context of the reduction of nuclear weapons. As mentioned above, the 
strategic nuclear warheads are going to be reduced, but there is no legal restriction 
an or reduction of tactical nuclear warheads. President Bush has submitted many 
statements an nuclear weapons, but he has neuer talked an the restriction an or 
reduction of tactical nuclear weapons. 
  The reduction of strategic nuclear weapons is now possible because he does not 
think Russia as an enemy any more. He seems to reconfirm the importance of 
tactical nuclear weapons because, today, rogue states are new threat to the U.S. 
security. 
  Under the report of Nuclear Posture Review, it is recommended that a new role 
of nuclear weapons that can destroy enemy's target in deep underground be 
pursued. These are tactical nuclear weapons. One of the main reasons why the 
U.S. never refers to the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons is its reaffirmation of 
the importance and utility of tactical nuclear weapons. On the other hand, in 
Russia, so many tactical nuclear weapons are reportedly deployed or stored in 
insecure condition. Their security condition is worse than the rase of strategic
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nuclear weapons. As a result, there is a danger that those tactical nuclear weapons 
will be stolen, robbed or lost. 
  Under these circumstances, the U.S. and Russia should take positive measures to 
control, regulate or reduce tactical nuclear weapons as soon as possible.
Missile Defense
  One of the most outstanding issues in Bush's policy from the beginning is 
concerned with missile defense. In his first principal statement an May 1, 2001, 
President Bush emphasized that the U.S. should move beyond the ABM Treaty. 
Since the previous Administration, missile defense had been argued by 
distinguishing national missile defense (NMD) and theater missile defense (TMD), 
but President Bush erased this distinction and merged both into missile defense, and 
determined to pursue both programs as one and whole. The main reasons of this 
change are, first, to alleviate European concern that the NMD will protect he U.S. 
only, and second, to use each technology in other program. 
  The Clinton Administration, by clearly distinguishing NMD and TMD, 
conducted tests within the area that does not conflict with the ABM Treaty, and 
proposed partial amendment of the ABM Treaty to Russia. On the other hand, 
Bush's plan an missile defense includes development, esting and deployment of 
not only land-based system that is permitted under the ABM, but also sea-based, 
air-based and space-based systems. It also includes systems that counter coming 
missiles in boost stage as well as mid-course and terminal stages. His plan is too 
ambitious to cope with by partial amendments of the ABM Treaty. 
  In the consultation with Russia, the U.S. initially argued for joint withdrawal 
from the ABM Treaty with Russia in order to move beyond the Treaty. Contrarily, 
Russia regards the Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability, and has no will to 
withdraw jointly. It was expected at U.S.-Russia summit meeting in November 
2001 that they would agree a kind of package an strategic nuclear reduction and 
amendment of the ABM Treaty. However, no agreement emerged, and the U.S. 
announced aunilateral reduction of strategic nuclear warheads. 
  One month later, an December 13, the U.S. notified to Russia its decision to 
withdraw from the Treaty in accordance with the provision of the Treaty. As six 
months prior notification is required, the withdrawal took effect an June 13, 2002. 
  Ort that day, President Bush stated; "Today that withdrawal formally takes 
effect. Our task is to develop and deploy effective defenses against limited missile 
attacks...1 am committed to deploying a missile defense System as soon as possible
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to protect the American people and our deployed forces against the growing missile 
threats we face." 16) He is planning to develop, test and deploy all kinds of missile 
defense systems as soon as possible. 
  Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, Director of Missile Defense Agency, an June 25, 2002, 
gave a special briefing an missile defense. As an overview, he emphasized that 
NMD and TMD distinction no longer exists, and that the purpose is limited defense 
against long-range threat and robust defense against shorter range threats. 
Withdrawing from the ABM Treaty opens missile defense options for greater 
effectiveness, improves ability to test more realistically, and makes possible new 
models for allies and friends to participate in the missile defense program.17)
  The U.S. also is asking for Russian cooperation an missile defense, and an May 
24, 2002 at Moscow summit, the two countries signed a Joint Declaration an New 
U.S.-Russia Relationship. Under the declaration, the U.S. and Russia acknowledge 
that today's security environment is fundamentally different than during the Cold 
War, and both countries have agreed to implement a number of steps aimed at 
strengthening confidence and increasing transparency. They include the exchange 
of information an missile defense programs and tests in this area, reciprocal visits 
to observe missile defense tests, and observation aimed at familiarization with 
missile defense systems. They have also agreed to study possible areas for missile 
defense cooperation.18) 
  Missile defense policy of the Bush Administration is quite aggressive, planning 
to deploy missile defense system as soon as possible. For the time being, the 
possibility of confrontation with Russia an missile defense seems low. Whether the 
U.S. missile defense will develop rapidly depends an many elements including U.S. 
domestic political Situation, technical feasibility, budget availability, and reaction 
from China.
Nuclear Test Ban
  President Clinton was very eager to prohibit any nuclear testing, and he was an 
promoter of and the first signatory to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
16) "Text: Bush Pledges Greater Dialogue, Cooperation an Missile Defense," Washington File, 13 
  June, 2002. 
17) "Lt. Gen Kadish Special Briefing an Missile Defense," U.S. Department of Defense, News 
   Transcript, June 25, 2002. 
  [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2002/y06252002 t kadish.html]` 
18) "Text: Joint Declaration an New U.S.-Russia Relationship," Washington File, 24 May 2002.
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(CTBT). However, the U.S. Senate, where Republicans held majority, adopted the 
resolution which rejected the ratification of the CTBT in 1999. 
  In a sharp contrast, President Bush from the beginning has made his Opposition 
to the Treaty crystal clear. As the reasons of his opposition, he referred to 
following two elements; firstly, as the verification provisions of the Treaty is not 
strong enough, there is a danger that we can not detect nuclear tests conducted in 
violation of the Treaty, and secondly, as it is indispensable to secure safety and 
reliability of existing nuclear weapons, we may need to conduct test for that 
purpose. President Bush declared that he would not ask the Senate for its 
ratification. 
  In addition, President Bush has used any occasion to weaken the effect of the 
Treaty. For example, the clause an early entry into force of the CTBT was omitted 
in the final document of Genoa Summit in July 2001, in spite of the fact that all 
previous summit declarations included the clause. The U.S. did not attend the 
Conference to promote entry into force of the CTBT in October 2001. In addition, 
the U.S. voted against Japanese_draft resolutions in the UN General Assembly an 
"A Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons" in 2001 and 2002
, just 
because the draft resolutions recommended early entry into force of the CTBT. 
  Currently, the Bush Administration agrees'with moratorium of nuclear testing, 
although it is opposed to the CTBT. However, the Nuclear Posture Review asks the 
Department of Energy to accelerate the preparedness of nuclear testing, that is, 
make preparation period much shorter from current two to three years to several 
months. It also asks for new human resources for nuclear testing as many testing 
personnel have retired. In this way, although the Administration does not explicitly 
show its intention to test, the preparation of nuclear testing has been gradually 
pushed forward behind the scene, and once it is decided to test, they could test 
smoothly and promptly. 
  Accordingto the Administration's formal statement, he possible purpose of 
nuclear testing would be to secure safety and reliability of existing nuclear 
weapons, and not to develop a new kind of nuclear weapons. However, Bush's 
nuclear policy is adamantly asking for nuclear weapons that can penetrate deep 
underground and destroy enemy's targets buried there. This could be done by 
improving current nuclear weapons or by developing a new kind of nuclear 
weapons. It can not be denied that then nuclear testing may become necessary.
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
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  The central consideration of the Bush's security policy is how to respond to 
possible missile attacks with weapons of mass destruction, and as a result, policy 
emphasis is an the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
and missiles. In this context, it makes effort for the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, and contributes to the maintenance and strengthening of the international 
nuclear non-proliferation regime. 
  President Bush defines Iraq, North Korea and Iran as constituting "an axis of 
evil", and his effort for non-proliferation focuses an these three states. Iraq has not 
implemented its promise to destroy all weapons of mass destruction that was the 
condition of the end of the Gulf War under the UN Security Council resolution 687 
of 1991. Based an this fact, the U.S. has been keeping an Option to use armed 
forces alone against Iraq. 
  The negotiation between the U.S. and North Korea has not started yet, while the 
Bush Administration showed three conditions for the resumption of discussion in 
June 2001. In October 2002, it was reported that North Korea acknowledged its 
pursuance of uranium enrichment program for nuclear weapons. The elimination of 
the program is now a new precondition for the U.S. to resume discussion. The U.S. 
now does not have a plan to use forces against North Korea, and its most important 
goal is to make North Korea destroy all nuclear development programs. 
  On the other hand, from the viewpoint of the universality of the NPT, the U.S. 
policy is seriously faulty, because it tacitly recognizes the nuclear status of Israel. 
In addition, the U.S. lifted its economic sanctions agaist India and Pakistan 
instituted based an their nuclear testing in May 1998, because the U.S. needed their 
cooperation, in particular Pakistan's cooperation, in connection with the military 
operations in Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks an September 11, 2001. In this 
case, the policy priority was given to the war against terrorism rather than nuclear 
non-proliferation. 
  The U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy, while, generally speaking, supporting 
the principle to oppose the proliferation of weapons mass destruction and missiles, 
is rather flexible to respond to particular situations in accordance with its national 
interest. Nuclear non-proliferation is not necessarily given the highest priority. 
  The Review Conference of the NPT that is the central pillar of the international 
nuclear non-proliferation regime, in 2000, adopted a final document. The U.S. is 
now pursuing the policies that clearly contradict with some measures for nuclear 
disarmament which are included in the final document. The U.S. does not support 
the CTBT and is opposed to its early entry into force, the U.S. way of the nuclear 
reduction contradicts with the principle of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament,
2003 NUCLEAR POLICY OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 17
and the U.S. nuclear policy does not necessarily accord with the requirement to 
reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its security policy. This gives rise to the 
objection from the 183 non-nuclear-weapon states that the U.S. policy would 
unilaterally destroy the Balance of obligations under the NPT.
No- Use of Nuclear Weapons
  Traditional nuclear doctrine of the U.S. and the NATO has defined its use only 
as a last resort, although it has not excluded the possibility of first-use of nuclear 
weapons. The Soviet Union or Russia has been a possible target, and the doctrine 
of mutual assured destruction (MAD) has been accepted. Responding to possible 
attacks by rogue states by chemical or biological weapons, the U.S. policy has been 
ambiguous by not clearly excluding the use of nuclear weapons. 
  In the context of the NPT, the U.S. has givenas political declarations the 
negative security assurances (NSA) that the U.S. would not use nuclear weapons to 
the parties to the NPT or treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. The U.S. 
position an the NSA has not been crystal clear, as high officials sometimes made 
statements contrary to the declarations. 
  Generally speaking, the firebreak between nuclear weapons and non-nuclear 
weapons has been maintained for last several decades, and very critical decision has 
been thought o be necessary to cross the border to nuclear weapons. However, 
under the Bush Administration's policy, a new triad is proposed in place of an old 
triad (ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers). The new triad consists of non-nuclear and 
nuclear strike capabilities, defenses and responsive infrastructure. In other word, 
non-nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons are treated as being an the same level, 
eliminating the firebreak between the two. 
  Under the Bush's policy, the useof nuclear weapons is considered not against 
Russia but against the rogue states, and it is not strategic but tactical nuclear 
weapons that is possibly used. The main and precise purpose to use tactical nuclear 
weapons against the rogue states is to defeat hard and deeply buried target that 
could not be destroyed by conventional weapons. 
  According to the National Security Strategy, the U.S. would take preemptive or 
anticipatory action to counter a sufficient threat, even if uncertainty remains as to 
the time and place of the enemy's attack. It may include preemptive nuclear attack, 
which will be very dangerous doctrine for international peace and security. 
  Negative security assurances have been given for last twenty years, though its 
real position is ambiguous. Under the Nuclear Posture Review, Iran, North Korea,
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Iraq, Syria and Libya are included in the contingencies where the U.S. may 
consider that the use of nuclear weapons may become necessary. All these states 
are parties to the NPT, and although the first two states are thought not to be 
implementing their obligation, but the latter three states are good standing as to the 
NPT obligations. This new policy is quite different from the previous policy. 
  In conclusion, the Bush's policy an the use of nuclear weapons has a tendency 
to shift its focus from strategic to tactical nuclear weapons and increase the 
possibility of their use.
Characteristics of Bush Administration's Nuclear Policy
  Foreign policy in general of the Bush Administration has been analyzed as an 
unilateralist approach, based of the following facts; breakaway from the Kyoto 
Protocol, Opposition to the International Criminal Court, withdrawal from the ABM 
Treaty, Opposition to the CTBT, opposition to the Protocol to the Biological 
Weapons Convention, and Opposition to the Program of Action an Small Arms. 
The analysis seems to be valid even in nuclear policy field. 
  However, after September 11, 2001, even the U.S. can not act unilaterally to 
counter terrorism, and needs international cooperation. As a result, the analysis 
through unilateralism can not explain enough this new trend. The basic stance of 
U.S. foreign policy is to act in accordance with its national interest. In order to 
promote its national interest, the U.S. acts unilaterally when it can do it by acting 
unilaterally, and the U.S. acts in cooperation with other states when it is necessary 
to do so to advance its national interest. 
  When we say the U.S. is acting in order to benefit national interest, the national 
interest means one that is near-sighted and strictly defined. That is, it does not 
include international public interest at all. International norms or rules of 
international law are easily abandoned when they are not useful for U.S. national 
interest. The United Nations and other international institutions are used by the 
U.S. when they are coincident with its national interest, but they are ignored when 
they are not beneficial to U.S. national interest. This is the most salient 
characteristic of the Bush Administration. 
  The other outstanding characteristic of the Bush Administration is the tendency 
to resolve disputes not by dialogue or consultation within the international society, 
but by using or threatening to use military forces. It is based an the fact that 
Russia's military power is rapidly decreasing, China's military force is still not 
strong enough, and the U.S. now has extraordinary military strength by spending
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40% of world military expenditure. In the National Security Strategy, it is 
emphasized that "Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries 
from pursuing a military buildup in hopes of surpassing, or equaling the power of 
the United States." The U.S. is planning to be the strongest in foreseeable future. 
  These two characteristics are reflected even in its nuclear policy. In its policy 
an nuclear weapons, the U.S. is pursuing it in order to advance its national interest 
that is near-sighted and strictly defined, and the U.S. is implementing its policy by 
depending mainly an military power rather than international norms or rules of 
international law or international institutions.
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